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[A] patent system must be related to the world of com-
merce rather than to the realm of philosophy. 
 –Justice Fortas1 
One of the most important questions in patent policy today is 
whether the acts of making and using a patented invention for re-
search purposes should be exempt from infringement liability. The 
basic idea, as Justice Fortas hinted in 1966, is to ensure that those 
who obtain patents can use the monopoly power inherent in the 
patent grant to capture profits from competing sales and other 
commercial activity, but not to stifle the research and experimenta-
tion that promotes innovation and helps government officials eva-
luate the health and safety risks associated with new technological 
developments. 
Appropriately, the research exemption (also known as the ex-
perimental use doctrine) has been the subject of significant legal 
scholarship and at least one major congressional inquiry over the 
                                                                                                                            
1 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966). 
2016] POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE RESEARCH EXEMPTION 575 
 
last thirty years.2 Yet much of the legal scholarship has focused on 
normative questions like whether the law should have an exemp-
tion and what form it should take. Less attention has been given to 
the doctrine’s legal and political history, or to the arguments and 
economic interests of the individuals and institutions that have 
shaped the law in this area into its current convoluted form.3 
The call for such an analysis is amplified by the appearance, 
over the last decade, of several pivotal studies of the political econ-
omy of intellectual property law, emphasizing changes in the law 
since the 1970s. These studies tend to be “horizontal” in the sense 
of analyzing large policy regimes and revealing broad themes. The 
narrowest among them focuses on the entire patent system (Scher-
er),4 while others go even broader to include legal developments in 
copyright (Landes and Posner)5 and finance (Coriat and Weins-
tein).6 Few if any “vertical” studies trace the historical develop-
ment of a single issue within the patent system to illustrate or chal-
lenge arguments about broader themes in the political economy of 
intellectual property law. 
This Article approaches the research exemption, and related 
legal developments, as a case study in the political economy of pa-
tent law. Part I recounts the history of the research exemption, 
touching briefly on historical origins but emphasizing develop-
ments since the 1970s in legislative, executive, and judicial forums. 
It also examines changes during the same time frame in related 
                                                                                                                            
2 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1065–66 (1989); Janice M. Mueller, No 
“Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for 
Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2001); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a 
Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1205 (2000). On the 
congressional inquiry, see infra Section I.F.2. 
3 For a notable exception, emphasizing the relationship between the common law 
exemption and biotechnology policy, see Maureen Boyle, Leaving Room For Research: The 
Historical Treatment of the Common Law Research Exemption in Congress and the Courts, and 
Its Relationship to Biotech Law and Policy, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 269 (2009). 
4 F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States, 7 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 167 (2009). 
5 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2004). 
6 Benjamin Coriat & Olivier Weinstein, Patent Regimes, Firms and the Commodification 
of Knowledge, 10 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 267 (2012). 
576 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:573 
 
areas of patent law, like the Bayh-Dole legislation and the at-
tempted repeal of state immunity from patent infringement liabili-
ty. These legal developments indirectly affected the research ex-
emption, or implicated similar concerns about imbalance in the pa-
tent system and the use of patents to tax, control, or inhibit re-
search activity. 
Part II analyzes this history to illustrate and expand upon two 
major themes in the political economy of patent law, namely the 
surprising persistence of faulty economic ideology in patent poli-
cymaking and the institutional bias exhibited by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit in shaping modern patent law. One 
major conclusion is that together these forces have created an ex-
cessively complex and ill-designed policy environment that is plac-
ing a significant strain on the national research system, a strain that 
executive agencies and the courts have tried to alleviate through ad 
hoc agreements and modifications of other patent doctrines, like 
the doctrine of subject matter eligibility. 
I. THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE RESEARCH EXEMPTION 
The research exemption has a long and colorful history in 
American law. Legendary Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story first 
articulated the idea in a case from 1813.7 But since the middle of the 
1970s, the idea of protecting future research and development from 
patent infringement liability has endured increasing criticism and 
attack in both judicial and legislative forums. In 1985, an adminis-
trative law court interpreted the Patent Act in a way that rendered 
obsolete a specific research exemption codified in a separate statu-
tory scheme, the Plant Variety Protection Act.8 In 1990, Congress 
rejected an attempt to clarify and codify Story’s common law doc-
trine and, at the same time, passed a bill to eliminate the immunity 
from patent infringement that states and their universities histori-
cally enjoyed.9 And in 2002, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit narrowed Story’s common law doctrine so significantly that 
                                                                                                                            
7 See infra text accompanying notes 12–17. 
8 See infra text accompanying note 78. 
9 See infra Section I.F. 
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it no longer has much impact.10 One notable exception runs con-
trary to this trend: in 1984, Congress created a robust research ex-
emption for patents on pharmaceuticals that require regulatory ap-
proval, and the Supreme Court has thus far remained stalwart in 
protecting that statutory exemption from judicial attempts to nar-
row it.11 Overall, these developments have created a complex and 
convoluted system when it comes to protecting research and de-
velopment from patent infringement liability, a convoluted frame-
work that is proof of political forces at work. 
A. The Research Exemption is Born: Whittemore v. Cutter and 
Sawin v. Guild (1813) 
A research exemption has existed in American common law 
since at least 1813 when Justice Story decided Whittemore v. Cutter. 
In this patent infringement case, the trial judge instructed the jury 
that “the making of a machine fit for use, and with a design to use 
it for profit” violated the Patent Act of 1800.12 The defendant (od-
dly) objected to this instruction on grounds that making a patented 
machine can never be infringement, whether made with a design to 
use it for profit or not.13 On the defendant’s motion for a new trial, 
Justice Story (who was riding circuit in Massachusetts) denied that 
objection.14 In doing so, he noted that the instruction was favorable 
to the defendant, and that the trial judge had appropriately con-
cluded “that it could never have been the intention of the legisla-
ture to punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for 
philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the 
sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.”15 
Justice Story also suggested that the exemption flowed from the 
definition of the statutory acts constituting infringement, and not 
from any perceived lack of harm to the patent holder. The defen-
dant had also argued that the making of a machine alone, without 
use of the machine for profit, cannot be an act of patent infringe-
                                                                                                                            
10 See infra text accompanying notes 146–53. 
11 See infra Section I.D. 
12 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 Fed. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813). 
13 Id. 
14 Id.; see also Ronald D. Hantman, Experimental Use as an Exception to Patent 
Infringement, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 617, 619 (1985). 
15 Whittemore, 29 Fed. Cas. at 1121. 
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ment since the patent holder suffers no damages from the act of 
making the machine.16 Justice Story denied that objection on 
grounds that every act of infringement is actionable, even if only for 
nominal damages.17 Thus, the exemption’s legal basis primarily lies 
in the contention that research and experimentation are not action-
able instances of “making” or “using” an invention, regardless of 
whether those acts technically cause any harm or not. In recent 
years, the analysis has focused more heavily on the intent prong of 
Story’s framework or on the patent holder’s expectation (i.e., 
harm), but this early emphasis on categories of protected conduct 
arguably remains the most appropriate and useful way for thinking 
about the research exemption. 
Later that same year, Sawin v. Guild presented the question of 
whether a sheriff can seize and sell a patented machine to satisfy a 
judgment against the owner.18 The owner of the patented machine, 
John Sawin, sued the sheriff, John Guild, alleging that the sale of 
the patented machine was an act of infringement.19 The court en-
tered a nonsuit in favor of the sheriff on grounds that such a sale 
does not constitute an act of infringement within the meaning of 
the patent laws.20 Justice Story, who also decided Sawin, noted that 
the plain language of the Patent Act must be interpreted in a “rea-
sonable fashion” so as not “to introduce public mischiefs,” and 
that the expansive definition of an infringing “sale” must yield to 
the broader public policy favoring orderly execution of judg-
ments.21 Justice Story emphasized that this limitation on the defini-
tion of infringing sales flowed naturally from the same concerns 
that motivated limitations on the definition of the infringing acts of 
making and using a patented invention articulated in Whittemore.22 
In the 169 years after Whittemore and Sawin, and before the 
Federal Circuit entered the scene, the federal courts attempted to 
further refine the scope of the common law exemption, and gener-
                                                                                                                            
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Sawin v. Guild, 21 Fed. Cas. 554, 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 555. 
21 Id. at 554. 
22 Id. at 555. 
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ally invoked the exemption to protect those who wished to adapt an 
invention to their own business purpose (i.e., to determine whether 
or not to purchase or negotiate a license to a patented invention), 
so long as they did not profit from the experimentation or adapta-
tion itself.23 While seldom invoked or litigated, the exemption pro-
vided a well-known safe harbor for “philosophical experiment” as 
well as for testing a patented invention, but fell short of protecting 
experimentation for the purpose of improving or designing around 
an invention with the intent to profit from that research in the fu-
ture. 
B. The Plant Variety Protection Act: A Special Statutory Exemption 
for Plants that Reproduce Sexually (1970) 
In 1970, Congress considered whether it should expand the 
boundaries of patent eligible subject matter to include plants that 
reproduce sexually.24 The prior Congress had investigated whether 
the “plant section” of the Patent Act,25 which allowed patents for 
plants that reproduce asexually, should simply be amended to also 
allow patents on plants that reproduce sexually, but that approach 
raised “[a] number of objections.”26 The 91st Congress therefore 
considered and ultimately passed the Plant Variety Protection Act 
of 1970 (“PVPA”), which allowed the Department of Agriculture 
to issue “certificates” (similar to patents) for novel varieties of 
sexually reproduced plants.27 
The purported purpose of the PVPA was “to encourage the 
development of novel varieties of sexually reproduced plants and to 
make them available to the public . . . thereby promoting progress 
in agriculture in the public interest.”28 The Department of Agricul-
ture and incumbent seed breeders aligned unanimously in favor of 
                                                                                                                            
23 Hantman, supra note 14, at 638–39. 
24 Plant Variety Protection Act: Hearing on S. 3070 Before Subcomm. on Agric. Research 
and Gen. Legis. of S. Comm. on Agric. and Forestry, 91st Cong. (1970) [hereinafter 1970 
Plant Variety Protection Act Hearing]. 
25 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2012). 
26 S. REP. NO. 91-1246, at 3 (1970). 
27 Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 7 and 28 U.S.C.); S. REP. NO. 91-1138, at 1 (1970). 
28 S. REP. NO. 91-1138, at 1. 
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the bill, arguing that legislation “is needed to provide incentive to 
plant breeders to develop new and improved varieties.”29 
This idea—that patents encourage or incentivize innovation—
is what we might call the “central dogma” of patent law, for it is 
the standard refrain of those seeking to expand patent rights to en-
compass formerly un-patentable subject matter, or eliminate doc-
trines like the research exemption that narrow the reach of the pa-
tent grant. The merits of this hypothesis (and it is only a hypothe-
sis) are discussed in Part II. Here, it is important simply to ac-
knowledge that, despite the incredible frequency with which this 
hypothesis is repeated in judicial and legislative settings, it is not 
necessarily true for the patent system as a whole, nor is it a useful 
way for comparing alternative policies and determining which is 
optimal. 
Importantly, the PVPA included a statutory research exemp-
tion, most likely because Congress wanted to ensure that American 
farmers and seed companies could compete with agribusiness in 
England and the nations of Western Europe, most of whom had 
joined an organization—the International Union for the Protection 
of Plant Varieties (“UPOV”)—that promulgated a series of legal 
standards which included a research exemption.30 In essence, Con-
                                                                                                                            
29 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act Hearing, supra note 24, at 1 (statement of Sen. 
Jordan of N.C.); see also S. REP. NO. 91-1138, at 14 (1970) (stating that the Department of 
Agriculture supports the bill and “believe[s] that it is desirable to provide incentive for 
private enterprise to undertake the research and development required to produce novel 
varieties of sexually produced plants”). 
30 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 91-1605, at 1–2 (1970) (describing England’s and Western 
Europe’s progress); Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1993: Hearing on S. 1406 
Before the Subcomm. on Agric. Res., Conservation, Forestry, and Gen. Legis. of the S. Comm. 
on Agric. Nutrition and Forestry, 103d Cong. 2 (1993) (arguing that the PVPA was enacted 
in part “to alleviate the competitive disadvantage that American agriculture and breeders 
face because European countries offered protection under UPOV”). For the text of the 
exemption in the PVPA, see Plant Variety Protection Act § 114, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 
Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2544) (“The use and reproduction of a protected 
variety for plant breeding or other bona fide research shall not constitute an infringement 
of the protection provided under this [Act].”). The Act of 1961 of the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants contained a form of research 
exemption in Article 5(3), which permitted use of a protected variety without the 
breeder’s permission “either for the utilization of the new variety as an initial source of 
variation for the purpose of creating other new varieties or for the marketing of such 
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gress may have simply “borrowed” the research exemption for 
sexually reproduced plants from the UPOV legal regime, without 
too much inquiry into its merits, so that American businesses could 
compete on equal footing with foreign firms. Another possibility is 
that the United States wished to one day join the UPOV, which it 
ultimately did in 1981, and needed a research exemption to do so.31 
During a Senate subcommittee hearing on the bill, one witness 
noted the connection between the research exemption and the 
bill’s purported purpose, in a way that anticipated the Bayh-Dole 
Act a decade later.32 George Babcock, a manager from the Grower 
Seed Association in Lubbock, Texas, argued that the research ex-
emption would allow public research agencies—whom many coop-
eratives and small seed companies relied on—to continue their re-
search agenda without the prospect of infringement liability and, 
importantly, the potential revenue generated from intellectual 
property protection would allow public agencies to invest more 
money in research and development.33 Babcock therefore sug-
gested that a broad safe harbor for research combined with stronger 
patent rights for private firms and public agencies alike might 
create an optimal balance in the law.34 
Congress amended the PVPA in 1980 to eliminate an exclusion 
that major soup companies had obtained for certain vegetables, and 
to extend the term of protection by one year; but the debate over 
the bill quickly went beyond these narrow proposals and into a 
deeper assessment of the PVPA as a whole.35 Opponents of the 
PVPA argued that it was eliminating genetic plant diversity and 
encouraging the formation of monopolistic seed companies that 
were driving up seed prices.36 Some advocates, including Repre-
sentatives Tom Daschle and Tom Harkin, argued that while the 
narrow amendments in the bill should become law, Congress would 
                                                                                                                            
varieties.” International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, art. 
5(3), Dec. 2, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 89. 
31 Boyle, supra note 3, at 286–87. 
32 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act Hearing, supra note 24, at 71–73 (statement of 
George B. Babcock, Manager, Grower Seed Association). 
33 Id. at 72. 
34 Id. 
35 Pub. L. No. 96-574, 94 Stat. 3350 (1980). 
36 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1115, at 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6954, 6959. 
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need to return to these broader issues at a later time.37 In contrast, 
the American Patent Law Association argued in favor of the PVPA 
because the United States was lagging behind other nations when it 
comes to innovation in plant breeding, and that the patent laws 
“provide strong incentives for industry to invest in research and 
development.”38 
The congressional hearings and reports on the 1980 amend-
ments show that Congress believed the PVPA was a success.39 The 
House subcommittee that reported favorably on the bill argued that 
the PVPA had dramatically increased both private expenditures in 
research and the number of new plant varieties available to farmers 
in the marketplace, citing the sugar snap pea as an exemplary by-
product of the Act.40 Importantly, if one adopts that evidence as 
proof of a beneficial causal effect (which is highly suspect), then 
the PVPA is also evidence that a broad research exemption does 
not significantly undermine the basic incentives provided in the 
statutory scheme. 
Just as with the original legislation, the debate over the PVPA 
amendments also elicited insightful testimony from those who op-
posed the law. Cary Fowler, of the National Sharecropper’s Fund, 
argued that the evidence relating increased research expenditures 
and varieties to the PVPA was shaky at best, since research expend-
itures were on the rise long before the PVPA became law, and the 
evidence on increased varieties was inappropriately counting varie-
ties developed before the PVPA was enacted as evidence of post-
PVPA inventions.41 Fowler also invoked a study by the National 
Academy of Sciences which described the purported successes re-
lied on by the Carter administration as “fine-tuned adjustments” 
to existing varieties and not “major breakthrough[s].”42 
                                                                                                                            
37 Id. at 40. 
38 Plant Variety Protection Act: Hearing on S. 23, S. 1580, and S. 2820 Before the 
Subcomm. on Agric. Res. and Gen. Legis. of the S. Comm on Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry, 
96th Cong. 143 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Plant Variety Protection Act Hearing] (statement 
of Donald Dunner, President, American Patent Law Association). 
39 See generally id.; H.R. REP. NO. 96-1115 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6954. 
40 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1115, at 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6954, 6957. 
41 1980 Plant Variety Protection Act Hearing, supra note 38, at 117 (statement of Cary 
Fowler, National Sharecroppers Fund). 
42 Id. 
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Fowler was also concerned about the PVPA’s impact on com-
petition and research, and raised early warnings about the United 
States’ interest in joining the UPOV. Specifically, Fowler noted 
that domestic and international plant breeding organizations were 
finding that patent rights over plants were restricting “the ex-
change of scientific information and breeding materials” and creat-
ing monopolistic markets that stifled innovation, despite existing 
research exemptions.43 And, according to Fowler, the Carter ad-
ministration had not explained why the United States should join 
the UPOV in the first place, since “[t]here are strong suspicions 
that the benefits to be derived [from joining] will flow to a handful 
of multinational corporations who are attempting to gain entry into 
foreign markets.”44 
C. Bayh-Dole and the Reform of Rights in Publicly Funded Research 
(1980) 
In the same year that it debated amendments to the PVPA, 
Congress also passed two laws that fundamentally altered the rela-
tionship between federal agencies (including federal laboratories), 
universities, and private industry. In 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act 
created a presumption that universities or small businesses that 
receive federal funding for research and development would retain 
title to any patents stemming from that research.45 And the Steven-
son-Wydler Act “required the principal government agencies con-
ducting [research] in-house to set up Research and Technology 
Applications offices” in order to “to negotiate exclusive patent li-
censes with industry for inventions resulting from agency re-
search.”46 Later, in 1986, the Federal Technology Transfer Act 
(“FTTA”) empowered government laboratories to enter into co-
operative research arrangements with private industry, “with the 
                                                                                                                            
43 Id. at 119. 
44 Id. at 122. 
45 Scherer, supra note 4, at 183; see also Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 
3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2012)). 
46 Scherer, supra note 4, at 183; see also Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act 
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701–
3714). 
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industrial partners retaining principal patent rights but paying 
royalties to cooperating agencies and their inventor employees.”47 
The political debates surrounding these controversial pieces of 
legislation are described in detail in the law review literature, but a 
few specific points about the Bayh-Dole Act deserve further dis-
cussion here.48 First, the Act’s proponents seem to have antic-
ipated that the proliferation of patent rights flowing from publicly 
funded research might lead to certain kinds of abusive behavior, 
like refusing to commercialize an invention or asserting patent 
rights in a manner that would harm public health or safety.49 At the 
same time, the safeguards enacted to protect against those poten-
tial abuses are extremely cumbersome, which suggests that those 
who supported the Act perceived the risk of abuse to be extremely 
low. These safeguards have since come under significant scruti-
ny.50 
Second, the Act’s adherents failed to anticipate the possibility 
that the proliferation of patent rights in inventions developed with 
federal money might be used to stifle or tax research and innova-
tion.51 Perhaps as a result, there is no mention of the research ex-
emption in either the House or the Senate reports, or in the tran-
script of the Senate hearing, on the bills that became the Bayh-Dole 
Act.52 The prospect of an institution using patents to suppress or 
attach onerous conditions to further experimentation simply was 
not considered. 
Finally, the Bayh-Dole Act and the related legislative reforms 
of the 1980s significantly influenced the political dynamics in de-
                                                                                                                            
47 Scherer, supra note 4, at 183; see also Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. 
L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3710). 
48 See Scherer, supra note 4, at 180–86; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research 
and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored 
Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1663–95 (1996). 
49 See Scherer, supra note 4, at 212. 
50 Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 293–95 (2003). 
51 Id. at 302 (describing an example of this outcome with work on the NF-kB pathway). 
52 See generally The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearing on S. 
414 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307(II) 
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6492; H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307(I) (1980), reprinted 
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460; S. REP. NO. 96-480 (1979). 
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bates over the research exemption by creating a new political inter-
est group: that of the professionals working in university technolo-
gy transfer offices, individuals who do not necessarily have the 
same values or interests as academic scientists and whose respon-
sibility is not to promote the public interest, but to generate reve-
nue for their employer.53 Some legal scholars have since argued 
that university technology transfer officials—organized under the 
auspices of the Association of University Technology Managers 
(“AUTM”)—now pose the most serious obstacle to patent reform 
in the United States,54 even though there is limited evidence that, 
as a whole, universities do more than break even under the Bayh-
Dole regime.55 This contention appears to have some support when 
it comes to the research exemption. In 2004, when the National 
Research Council and a prominent organization of intellectual 
property lawyers announced their support for codification of a re-
search exemption, the AUTM opposed that proposal.56 And in 
2010, when an advisory group to the Department of Health and 
Human Services recommended codification of a research exemp-
                                                                                                                            
53 Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 303, 305–06 (noting that universities have 
delegated their responsibilities under Bayh-Dole to technology transfer professionals 
“who are not themselves academics” and “who see their primary job as bringing 
licensing revenue into the university”). 
54 See, e.g., Elizabeth Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do 
Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (2006). Rowe’s argument 
against the exemption is premised on the assumption that it would only apply to 
universities, which is not necessarily true, but her examination of university interests in 
current debates over the exemption is insightful nevertheless. 
55 Eisenberg, supra note 48, at 1712 n.192. 
56 See AIPLA Response to National Academies Report Entitled “A Patent System for the 
21st Century,” AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N 2, http://www.aipla.org/advocacy/executive/ 
Documents/NAS092304.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TZ5-6TYB] (last visited Mar. 13, 2016) 
(“Codifying such an exemption as recommended by the NAS Report, would remove the 
uncertainty that now exists over the manner in which a patented invention can be used to 
better understand and/or extend what is patented.”). I have been unable to obtain a 
formal position on this issue from the AUTM. A copy of a webpage from autm.net, 
cached by Google on July 12, 2015, says “AUTM Formal Positions—published: 
03/19/2014 . . . Patent Law Research Exemption AUTM opposes a recommendation by 
the American Intellectual Property Law Association to codify a research and 
experimentation exception in the patent laws.” See Cached Search Results of AUTM 
Website (on file with author). 
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tion for certain kinds of genetic research, the AUTM opposed that 
proposal as well.57 
D. The Federal Circuit’s First Assault on the Research Exemption: 
The Bolar Decision and the Hatch-Waxman Act (1984) 
In 1982, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit as a specialized court to hear all appeals from patent cases 
in the federal district courts (as well as some other cases involving 
the federal government).58 In doing so, Congress discounted vari-
ous warnings that a specialized appellate court, with the unique 
ability to create national precedent on patent law issues, would suf-
fer from “tunnel vision” and be susceptible to being captured by 
special interests.59 
Within the first two years of its existence, the Federal Circuit 
tried to limit the common law research exemption. In Roche Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., the court decided that “the 
limited use of a patented drug for testing and investigation strictly 
related to [Food and Drug Administration] drug approval require-
ments” was an infringing use under the Patent Act and was not 
protected by the research exemption.60 The court ultimately held 
that the research exemption was “truly narrow” and that it would 
“not expand it under the present circumstances.”61 
In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit ignored cases 
interpreting the research exemption that arose from the federal dis-
trict and appellate courts, and chose to only consider precedent 
from its predecessor court, the Court of Claims.62 The Federal 
Circuit then disregarded three such cases where the Court of 
Claims acknowledged the exemption, finding the statements in 
those cases to be dicta or lacking precedential value, and relied on 
the one case where the Court of Claims chose not to apply the ex-
                                                                                                                            
57 Katherine L. Record, University Opposition to Unfettered Research: A New Bedfellow for 
Biotech?, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 139 (2012). 
58 See Scherer, supra note 4, at 191. 
59 Id. at 187–88 (quoting Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System 
Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 236 (1975)). 
60 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
61 Id. at 863. 
62 Id. at 862–63. 
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emption.63 The legal basis for taking such a narrow view of the re-
levant precedent is somewhat suspect, and reflects a certain degree 
of reverse engineering in support of a pre-determined outcome. 
Ironically, by the time the Federal Circuit decided the case, 
Roche’s patent had expired, and because the sole remedy Roche 
had requested was an injunction, the basic issue in the case was 
moot.64 In other words, the Federal Circuit no longer had the pow-
er to enjoin Bolar from testing the patented drug for purposes of 
obtaining regulatory approval because the patent had expired, and 
so the only remedy left available to Roche was for monetary dam-
ages in the district court, damages which were “nominal” accord-
ing to Roche’s own counsel.65 The Federal Circuit rendered a deci-
sion anyway, even though its decision threatened to upset negotia-
tions over an expansive overhaul of drug regulation and patenting 
that was before Congress at the time: the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
Congress quickly amended the Hatch-Waxman Act to repeal 
the Bolar decision.66 Overall, the Hatch-Waxman Act reflects a 
bargain between generic and non-generic pharmaceutical manufac-
turers, where the former obtained the right to seek approval from 
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) based on a simple 
showing that the generic product was “bioequivalent” to a pa-
tented drug (thus avoiding the expense of clinical trials), and the 
latter obtained longer patent terms to account for regulatory delays 
at the FDA.67 After the Federal Circuit decided Bolar, Congress 
amended the bill to allow drug manufacturers to infringe pharma-
ceutical patents “solely for uses reasonably related to the develop-
ment and submission of information under a Federal law.”68 
                                                                                                                            
63 Id. at 863. 
64 Id. at 865–67. 
65 Id. at 866. 
66 See Scherer, supra note 4, at 197 (noting that section 202 was dubbed the “Bolar 
amendment”). 
67 For a more thorough description of the bill’s history, see Scherer, supra note 4, at 
195–99. 
68 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(II), at 26 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2710 
(“Proposed subsection (e)(1) provides that it shall not be an act of infringement to make, 
use, or sell a patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information under a federal law which regulates the approval of drugs.”). 
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Some of the issues specific to the Hatch-Waxman Act—
especially the bill’s focus on the length of patent terms for pharma-
ceutical companies—influenced the legislative debate over the re-
search exemption in this context. For instance, opponents to the 
exemption for the first time characterized the policy as a shortening 
of the pharmaceutical industry’s patent terms and a taking of its 
property. The Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents 
and Trademarks argued that the exemption “would serve as an un-
fortunate precedent curtailing the exclusionary rights accorded a 
patentee during the patent term.”69 A member of the Board of Di-
rectors of Johnson & Johnson made the same argument, as did the 
President and CEO of Hoffman-La Roche, adding that the exemp-
tion would also be an unconstitutional taking of property.70 
The pharmaceutical industry’s emphasis on takings apparently 
influenced the congressional analysis of the Bolar amendment, as 
the House Committee on the Judiciary dedicated a significant por-
tion of its report to rebutting the takings argument (persuasively) 
under then-existing law.71 Subsequent legal developments have 
proved this analysis sound.72 But even though the Committee re-
ported favorably on the bill (including the Bolar provision), it also 
speculated that “there would be no need” to create a similar ex-
emption to allow, for example, engineers in the automobile indus-
try to test a patented engine, because no regulatory regime blocked 
car manufacturers from competing as soon as the patent expired.73 
The report also contains no mention of Whittemore, Sawin, or any 
other federal cases articulating the common law research exemp-
tion, suggesting that the House Judiciary Committee may not have 
                                                                                                                            
69 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Hearing on S. 2748 
Before S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 98th Cong. 164 (1984) (statement of Gerald J. 
Mossinghoff, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Comm’r of Patents and 
Trademarks). 
70 Id. at 129, 132 (statement of Verne Willaman, a member of the Board of Directors of 
Johnson & Johnson) (claiming that the provision would “shrink existing patent 
protection” and is “clearly inequitable”). 
71 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(II), at 61 n.18, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2721. 
72 See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per 
curiam) (holding that patents do not constitute property under the Takings Clause), 
vacated in part on other grounds, 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also id. at 1370 (Dyk, 
C.J., concurring). 
73 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(II), at 27, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2714. 
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even been aware of the doctrine’s legal origins. Similarly, the 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce argued in favor of the 
provision because “experimental activity does not have any ad-
verse economic impact on the patent owner’s exclusivity during 
the life of a patent.”74 These arguments do not accurately capture 
the basic legal principles supporting the research exemption in a 
broader form, a form not limited to testing of pharmaceuticals for 
FDA approval. The basic principle is that making and using a pa-
tented drug for experimentation is arguably a type of activity that 
the patent laws should promote rather than punish, irrespective of 
any alleged impact on a patent’s term or the need to pass regulato-
ry hurdles in order to enter the market once a patent expires. 
E. The Death of the PVPA and its Special Research Exemption: Ex 
parte Hibberd (1985) 
In 1980, in the historic case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Su-
preme Court determined that a genetically modified bacterium was 
patentable (i.e., was eligible subject matter).75 The result is consis-
tent with the general trend, in this period, toward expanding paten-
tability, and this case is often credited, perhaps falsely, with ensur-
ing that the patent system would accommodate the coming explo-
sion in biotechnology research.76 
But the decision also had one important unintended conse-
quence. By proclaiming that a bacterium—a “living thing”—was 
patentable under the Patent Act, the Supreme Court challenged 
the basic assumption that had motivated Congress to pass the Plant 
Patent Act (“PPA”) of 1930 and the PVPA of 1970. In other 
words, when Congress passed the PVPA, it had done so on the 
                                                                                                                            
74 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 46 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2679. 
75 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980). 
76 See H.R. REP. NO. 100-888, at 38, 69 (1988). The House Committee on the Judiciary 
inferred a causal relationship between the Chakrabarty decision and the four billion dollar 
domestic biotechnology industry, and argued without evidence that “[t]he availability of 
patent protection for biologically derived inventions has been the catalyst for the current 
biotechnology industry.” Id. at 69. This argument (and others like it) relies on the 
observation of concurrent increases in biotech investment and/or biotech patenting after 
Chakrabarty, trends that are difficult to interpret given the many changes occurring in 
patent law at this time (including the Bayh-Dole reforms), and which do not prove a 
causal impact in any event. See id. at 39. 
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premise that sexually reproduced plants could not be patented un-
der the Patent Act.77 Ten years later, in Chakrabarty, the Supreme 
Court suggested that this assumption was false. 
Subsequently, an administrative law court housed in the De-
partment of Commerce, known then as the Board of Patent Ap-
peals and Interferences (“BPAI”), used the Chakrabarty decision 
to effectively repeal the PVPA. In Ex parte Hibberd, the BPAI held 
that sexually reproduced plants can be patented under the Patent 
Act, and so there were, in effect, two separate statutory regimes for 
obtaining exclusive rights in plants that reproduce sexually.78 As a 
practical matter, the ruling meant that patent applicants would al-
ways choose the Patent Act over the PVPA because the Patent Act 
did not include statutory limitations on the patent holder’s rights, 
like the farmer’s saved seed exemption or a statutory research ex-
emption. 
The BPAI’s reasoning has several flaws, but the most perplex-
ing among them is the conclusion the BPAI reached regarding 
Congress’ burden at the time it passed the PVPA. The BPAI ap-
proached the issue through the analytical framework of “implicit 
repeals,” based on the fact that Congress did not, in the PVPA, 
explicitly repeal section 101 of the Patent Act to the extent that sec-
tion allowed for patents on plants that reproduce sexually.79 Yet 
Congress did not explicitly repeal any part of the Patent Act be-
cause it did not believe it had to, as the legislative history makes 
clear.80 Congress believed that the Patent Act did not allow patents 
on plants that reproduce sexually, so it had no motivation for indi-
                                                                                                                            
77 S. REP. NO. 91-1138, at 3 (1970); see also H.R. REP. NO. 91-1605 (1970), reprinted in 
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5082, 5083 (“No protection is available to those varieties of plants 
which reproduce sexually, that is, generally by seeds.”); S. REP. NO. 91-1246, at 3 (1970). 
78 Ex parte Hibberd, 1985 WL 71986, at *2–3 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 1985). In 1999, when 
the United States acceded to the 1991 Act of the International Convention for the 
Protection of New Plant Varieties, it did so pursuant to a reservation in Article 35(2) that 
it can continue to provide protection for novel varieties of sexually reproduced plants “by 
an industrial property title other than a breeder’s right [(i.e., under the Patent 
Act)] . . . without applying this Convention to those varieties.” International Convention 
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, art. 35(2), Mar. 19, 1991. As a result, the 
United States’ participation in the Convention is now essentially pro forma. 
79 Ex parte Hibberd, 1985 WL 71986, at *4–5. 
80 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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cating otherwise.81 Because of the BPAI’s view of the law regarding 
“implicit repeals,” Congress must explicitly repeal hypothetical 
changes in the judicial interpretation of a statute that may or may 
not come to pass in the coming decades. Curiously, the Supreme 
Court sanctioned this view sixteen years later.82 In the majority 
opinion of J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, 
Inc., the Court effectively ruled that in deciding what Congress in-
tended to do when it passed the PVPA, it is important to ignore the 
factual predicates and assumptions that motivated congressional 
action if the Supreme Court presently disagrees with them.83 
The J.E.M. dissent, authored by Justice Breyer, analyzed the 
legislative history and concluded that “Congress intended the two 
more specific statutes,” namely the PPA and the PVPA, “to ex-
clude patent protection under” section 101 of the Patent Act “for 
the plants to which the more specific Acts directly refer.”84 Justice 
Breyer also acknowledged that the majority’s forced reading of the 
statutory history effectively eliminated the PVPA’s statutory ex-
emptions, including the research exemption.85 
F. Congress Tackles the Research Exemption: The Patent 
Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act of 1990 
By the late 1980s, a host of patent reform measures were under 
congressional consideration. The 101st Congress considered five 
separate patent reform measures that had been raised in previous 
                                                                                                                            
81 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
82 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 134 (2001). 
83 Id. (“This does not mean, however, that prior to 1930 plants could not have fallen 
within the subject matter of § 101. Rather, it illustrates only that in 1930 Congress believed 
that plants were not patentable under § 101 . . . .”); see also id. at 135 (“Whatever 
Congress may have believed about the state of patent law and the science of plant 
breeding in 1930, plants have always had the potential to fall within the general subject 
matter of § 101 . . . .”); see also id. at 141 (“The relevant statements in the legislative 
history reveal nothing more than the limited view of plant breeding taken by some 
Members of Congress who believed that patent protection was unavailable for sexually 
reproduced plants. This view stems from a lack of awareness concerning scientific 
possibilities.”). 
84 Id. at 147 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
85 Id. at 155 (“The Court has advanced no sound reason why Congress would want to 
destroy the exemptions in the PVPA that Congress created. And the Court’s reading 
would destroy those exemptions.”). 
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legislative sessions, with all five of the measures bundled together 
as different titles in the same bill, the Patent Competitiveness and 
Technological Innovation Act of 1990 (“PCTIA”).86 
Two of the measures in the PCTIA implicated the research ex-
emption. The first proposed to repeal the immunity from infringe-
ment liability that the states—and their universities—enjoyed un-
der the doctrine of sovereign immunity.87 The second proposed to 
codify, once and for all, a broad research exemption with a carve 
out only for “research tools.”88 The repeal of state sovereign im-
munity passed the House and the Senate and became law, while the 
codification of the research exemption did not. 
1. Repeal of State Sovereign Immunity Passes 
In 1985, the Supreme Court decided a sovereign immunity case 
in which it emphasized its prior holding that, absent a waiver of 
immunity by a state, a lawsuit against a state (or its agencies) may 
proceed only if Congress has the Constitutional authority to abro-
gate sovereign immunity and does so “by making its intention un-
mistakably clear in the language of the statute.”89 Following this 
command, the Federal Circuit noted, in a separate case, that Con-
gress had not stated its intent to repeal state sovereign immunity 
for patent infringement under the Patent Act.90 Because of these 
rulings, Congress entertained proposals to explicitly repeal state 
immunity from patent infringement, and one of those proposals 
was ultimately incorporated into the PCTIA. In this specific set-
ting—where the Federal Circuit had indicated that it viewed that 
common law research exemption as “truly narrow,” the Bolar ex-
emption provided protection only for drug and medical device re-
                                                                                                                            
86 H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. (1990). 
87 Id. §§ 301–303. Though sovereign immunity is a separate and distinct doctrine, of 
constitutional and not common law origin, it accomplishes a similar purpose in the patent 
context since the doctrine immunizes state agencies and universities (where much 
experimentation takes place) from the risk of infringement liability. 
88 Id. at §§ 401–403; H.R. REP. NO. 101-960(I), at 32 (1990). 
89 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). 
90 Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 334 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“Assuming the Congress has 
the power to subject the states to patent infringement suits, a complex question we do not 
resolve herein, we conclude, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that Congress has 
evidenced no intent to exercise such power in the patent statute.”). 
2016] POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE RESEARCH EXEMPTION 593 
 
search, and the BPAI had effectively eliminated the statutory re-
search exemption under the PVPA—sovereign immunity provided 
a significant liability shield, allowing scientists at public universities 
to ignore non-pharmaceutical patents in the course of their re-
search. The proposal to repeal state sovereign immunity was in-
tended to remove that shield. 
Importantly, developments in international trade negotiations 
influenced the debate over the repeal of state sovereign immunity. 
At the time that Congress was considering the PCTIA, American 
industry was in the midst of its efforts to extend U.S. patent stan-
dards to the rest of the world through the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations, negotiations that resulted in the Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”) agreement.91 A group 
composed of the chief executives of thirteen major companies 
worked with U.S. trade negotiators and representatives of the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to implement a strategy of 
“linkage,” whereby the United States consistently refused to ratify 
any treaty unless it included provisions bringing all member na-
tions’ intellectual property laws up to U.S. standards.92 An impor-
tant negotiating point was whether less developed countries would 
retain compulsory licensing rights, giving those governments the 
power to infringe a patent in certain circumstances, such as if the 
nation wanted to manufacture or import a drug that had critical 
health consequences for its people but could not reach an agree-
ment over licensing terms with the patent holder.93 For the propo-
nents of TRIPS, these compulsory licensing rights were a form of 
governmental or sovereign immunity. 
Against this backdrop, the House debated the proposal to re-
peal state sovereign immunity.94 In a House subcommittee hearing, 
Jeffrey Samuels, the Acting Commissioner of the PTO, expressed 
the Department of Commerce’s support for the proposal, arguing 
                                                                                                                            
91 Scherer, supra note 4, at 203–05. 
92 Id. at 204–05. 
93 Id. at 205–06. 
94 While not important here, parallel provisions for trademark and copyright 
infringement were also debated and passed. See Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, 
Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat 3567 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C. (1992)); Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat 2749 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (1990)). 
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that sovereign immunity squelches the fundamental incentive to 
innovate created by the patent law.95 He also argued that failing to 
repeal state sovereign immunity “makes a mockery” of U.S. trade 
negotiations because the United States had requested that its trad-
ing partners eliminate all “nonvoluntary licensing and governmen-
tal use provisions” in their patent laws.96 A representative of an 
association of 6,000 intellectual property lawyers agreed with that 
position.97 Samuels also took the position that Congress did not 
need to extend to the states any of the same limitations on liability 
that the federal government enjoyed.98 
The legislative debate suggests that, to some, it was not clear 
how the repeal of sovereign immunity would affect the common 
law research exemption under Whittemore. Samuels argued that the 
repeal of state sovereign immunity would have “no effect” on the 
exemption.99 But Ray Farnbee, Vice Chancellor and General 
Counsel at the University of Texas, warned that the bill was overly 
broad and as a result, “it will encompass basic research at state-
supported colleges and universities which historically have” bene-
fited from a research exemption.100 The perspective of state attor-
neys general and universities may not have been thoroughly pre-
sented because, according to the Senate report, none of them ac-
cepted invitations to appear at the hearing.101 
                                                                                                                            
95 Patent Remedy Clarification Act: Hearing on H.R. 3886 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Intellectual Prop. and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 47 
(1990) (statement of Jeffrey Samuels, Acting Comm’r of Patents and Trademarks, Dep’t 
of Com.) (arguing that sovereign immunity “extinguishes the stimulus needed to 
innovate”). 
96 Id. at 8. 
97 Id. at 47 (“We have introduced very strong principles in the [General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade] proposals and elsewhere to overcome this. To have 50-State carve 
outs in our country while we are trying to maintain that posture in these negotiations is 
not consistent.”). 
98 Id. at 20. 
99 Id. at 22. The Chairman specifically asked “what, if any, effect would this change in 
law have on the research exemption in patent law as far as State universities are 
concerned?” to which Mr. Samuels responded, “In my view, it would have no effect.” Id. 
100 Id. at 85. 
101 S. REP. NO. 102-280, at 2 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3088 (“The 
House subcommittee invited state attorneys general and representatives of state 
universities to testify, but none accepted the invitation.”). 
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The House Committee on the Judiciary essentially adopted the 
Bush administration’s position, as articulated by Samuels, and re-
ported favorably on the measure. The Committee argued that so-
vereign immunity diminishes incentives to innovate, especially for 
“the types of inventions that are of particular uses to states, includ-
ing, for example, auto emission testing processes.”102 The Com-
mittee did not address whether the states could rely on public 
agencies for those innovations, or whether it made economic sense 
to expose all public universities to liability for patent infringement 
for the sake of “incentivizing” such a narrow range of develop-
ments. The Committee also determined that it was not appropriate 
to extend any of the limitations on federal liability to the states.103 
The Senate report expressed the same concern about diminish-
ing incentives for innovation, but paid more attention to the way 
that sovereign immunity caused disparate treatment between pub-
lic and private universities, and between state and federal govern-
ment agencies.104 The Senate report failed to explain why, if the 
avowed purpose of the bill was to treat state and federal govern-
ments equally, the bill did not extend the same liability limitations 
the federal government enjoyed to the states. The measure passed 
and became law.105 
After the bill passed, the United States failed to procure a con-
cession from less developed countries that would eliminate com-
pulsory licensing in the TRIPS agreement, and compulsory licens-
ing remains an important way for less developed countries to in-
duce pharmaceutical manufacturers into making significant price 
concessions.106 In the end, then, the United States’ unsustainable 
position on compulsory licensing made a mockery of the debate 
over sovereign immunity, at least for a time. It remains to be seen 
                                                                                                                            
102 H.R. REP. NO. 101-960(I), at 38 (1990); see also id. at 37 (stating that “public policy 
supports the broad applicability of the patent laws” and arguing that States must be liable 
in order to protect the “Constitutionally mandated incentive to create”). 
103 Id. at 39. 
104 S. REP. NO. 102-280, at 8–9, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3094–95 
(“Allowing a State to freely infringe upon the protection granted by the Patent Code and 
the Trademark Act effectively discourages future innovative.”). 
105 Patent and Plant Variety Protection Act Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-
560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 7 and 35 U.S.C.). 
106 Scherer, supra note 4, at 207. 
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whether foreign nations will concede to further limitations on 
compulsory licensing rights in the Trans-Pacific Partnership or 
other future trade agreements. 
Several years later, the Supreme Court invalidated the bill and 
restored state sovereign immunity from patent infringement liabili-
ty.107 While Congress had expressly repealed that immunity, the 
question was whether Congress had the authority to do so in the 
first instance, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution. The Federal Circuit held that Congress had that pow-
er.108 The Supreme Court reversed and struck down the law, the-
reby restoring sovereign immunity to the states.109 But while the 
Supreme Court’s decision ostensibly preserves a great deal of aca-
demic freedom for scientists at public universities, it has also un-
fortunately created a legal regime that treats public universities dif-
ferently from private universities, and the private companies that 
collaborate extensively with both types of universities under the 
Bayh-Dole regime. 
2. Codification of the Research Exemption Does Not Pass 
At the same time that the House considered the repeal of state 
sovereign immunity, it also considered a proposal to codify the re-
search exemption. As had happened previously, the debate over 
the research exemption arose out of a larger debate over the boun-
daries of patent eligible subject matter. In 1987, the PTO decided 
that genetically modified animals are patentable110 and, almost one 
year later, issued the first patent on a genetically engineered 
mouse.111 The 100th Congress then entertained various bills to co-
dify the PTO’s decision, making genetically modified or “transgen-
ic” animals patentable. 
                                                                                                                            
107 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999). 
108 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 
1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev’d, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
109 Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630. 
110 Ex parte Allen, No. 86-1790, 1987 WL 123816, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 3, 1987). 
111 U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988). For a discussion of the 
OncoMouse patent, and the disputes it provoked, see infra Section I.G. 
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The proposal drew tremendous support from the biotechnology 
industry and patent lawyers. Again, those witnesses in favor of pa-
tenting transgenic animals viewed “the patent law as an important 
incentive for the development of innovations.”112 One intellectual 
property lawyer took the usual refrain one step further by making 
patents the answer to looming crises of global health and poverty, 
arguing that patents on transgenic animals were both necessary and 
imperative “to provide an incentive for the agricultural research 
and development needed to alleviate predicted world-wide food 
shortages.”113 
As in previous debates, some remained skeptical about the ex-
tent to which the patent system actually incentivizes innovation, 
and whether the research exemption might be important for the 
patent system to achieve that goal in any event. The Environmental 
Policy Institute, for example, “questioned the need for an animal 
patent to achieve advances in livestock productivity because we 
already have seen advances in agriculture without the incentive of a 
patent.”114 The Wisconsin Farmer’s Union argued that publicly 
funded research formed the real basis for American biotechnology 
industry, and “questioned both the fairness in granting a monopoly 
market position to these corporations through a patent, and the ne-
cessity of patents to promote scientific progress.”115 Dennis Jelle, 
the President of the National Farmer’s Organization, and Tom 
Saunders, a dairy farmer, respectively noted that plant patent sta-
tutes had caused great amounts of consolidation among seed com-
panies, and that allowing patents for transgenic animals would “re-
sult in a less diverse productive base.”116 
The original bill making transgenic animals patentable con-
tained a research exemption, but the House Committee on the Ju-
diciary deleted that provision for two reasons: because the Com-
mittee believed that the existing common law exemption made the 
                                                                                                                            
112 H.R. REP. NO. 100-888, at 6 (1988). 
113 Id. at 12 (summary of testimony of Reid Adler); see also id. at 20 (lawyer Geoffrey 
Karny testifying that “prohibiting or delaying patents on transgenic animals could 
seriously delay new life-saving medicines and major agricultural breakthroughs”). 
114 Id. at 10 (summary of testimony of Jack Doyle); see also id. at 11 (summary of 
testimony of Cy Carpenter). 
115 Id. at 16 (summary of testimony of Stuart Huber). 
116 Id. at 16–17 (summary of testimony of Dennis Jelle and Tom Saunders). 
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provision “unnecessary,” and because if Congress wanted to codi-
fy a research exemption, it would be “desirable” to do so in a way 
that “would apply across the board to all patentable inventions” 
and not just transgenic animals.117 The Committee also noted that 
the international landscape had changed, since Japan and the na-
tions in western Europe had created research exemptions in their 
patent laws, and as a result, such a change would not “cause any 
serious trade distorting effect.”118 The Committee did not observe 
that failing to codify the exemption might cause domestic research-
ers to relocate their efforts abroad, under more hospitable legal re-
gimes, and potentially undermine the national research effort. 
Interestingly, at this point, the Committee was also aware that 
the idea that patents are essential for innovation—that the benefits 
of stronger patent rights always outweighs the detriments—was 
under attack. The Committee dedicated a three page section of its 
report to “Patents and Economic Incentives,” noting that “[m]uch 
of the sound and fury about the patentability of life forms has been 
over whether a patent system is a necessary form of incentive for 
innovation, or instead a source of monopoly power.”119 In deciding 
the question, the Committee invoked the traditional arguments 
that, without patents, there would be no innovation because firms 
would free-ride on the innovation of others, or firms would rely on 
secrecy instead of making inventions public which would prevent 
the dissemination of knowledge.120 Based on these arguments, the 
Committee concluded “that the political justification for the patent 
system (i.e., an incentive to create) has support in the economic 
literature,” but did not really address how the call for a research 
exemption would impact that political justification.121 
                                                                                                                            
117 H.R. REP. NO. 100-888, at 3, 70. 
118 Id. at 51. 
119 Id. at 66–68. 
120 Id. at 67. In this general time frame, more modern ideas about cumulative innovation 
were only just emerging and this more traditional mode of economic analysis remained 
dominant. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 842–44 (1990); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the 
Shoulder of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 30 (Winter 
1991). 
121 H.R. REP. NO. 100-888, at 68. 
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During the 101st Congress, the House separated the research 
exemption proposal from the transgenic animal proposal, but the 
Bush administration opposed the measure. The Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment (“OTA”), whom Congress had asked to evaluate 
the research exemption, did not respond to that request.122 The 
Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks 
indicated that the administration opposed legislation creating a re-
search exemption “because it could diminish the strong incentive 
provided by the patent system.”123 
The House Judiciary Committee reported the measure favora-
bly, despite the administration’s opposition, and included what ap-
pears to be the first thorough analysis of the exemption in the 
record of public debate. Overall, this part of the report represents a 
significant departure from the typical legislative discussion about 
the patent system and its relationship to research. For example, the 
Committee claimed that “[i]t is a central tenet of American patent 
law that there is a right to use scientific information to create new 
and better inventions in competition with the patented inven-
tion.”124 The Committee then suggested that the Federal Circuit 
may have improperly constrained the experimental use doctrine in 
holding that it “does not apply if the experimental use [is] coupled 
with commercial use.”125 The Committee also recognized that 
Bayh-Dole, Stevenson-Wydler, and the FTTA had changed the 
relationship between the government and research institutions, and 
concluded that, in an era of increasing public-private partnerships, 
“government and university scientists should not be confused 
about the permissible parameters of their research and experimen-
tation.”126 And finally, the Committee recognized that the exemp-
tion made economic sense. Without an exemption, “[u]nnecessary 
                                                                                                                            
122 Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1556 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st 
Cong. 19 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act Hearing] 
(statement of Kevin W. O’Connor, Senior Analyst, Office of Technology Assessment) 
(noting that the OTA “didn’t reach any conclusions on the research exemption” in its 
report and that “it is an area that many scholars find to be murky”). 
123 Id. at 189–90. 
124 H.R. REP. NO. 101-960(I), at 41 (1990). 
125 Id. at 42. 
126 Id. at 43. 
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litigation occurs, excessive threats are leveled, transaction costs are 
raised,” “experimentation and research are chilled,” and “[m]ore 
importantly, legitimate scientific activities are driven outside the 
United States.”127 Despite this rather prescient analysis, the meas-
ure did not pass. 
G. Escalating Disputes Over Access to Research Materials: The NIH 
Agreements Regarding the OncoMouse (1998–1999) 
In the years following the failed attempt to codify the research 
exemption in the PCTIA, several major disputes arose that sug-
gested the patent system was severely out of balance when it comes 
to protecting research activity. The first involved the OncoMouse, 
a major technological breakthrough in which scientists at Harvard 
University engineered mice with a genetic predisposition to devel-
oping cancer.128 The technology quickly became an important tool 
for scientists studying cancer in humans. 
At the time of the discovery, in 1984, it was not yet certain 
whether the PTO would issue patents on discoveries like genetical-
ly modified mice, thereby extending the logic of the Chakrabarty 
decision from bacteria to animals. But, as indicated above, in 1987, 
the PTO provided notice that it would issue such patents,129 and it 
granted the patent covering the OncoMouse on April 12, 1988.130 
Thus, as with other disputes over genetic technologies, the Onco-
Mouse dispute arose at a time when the federal courts and the 
PTO were expanding the boundaries of patent eligible subject mat-
ter. 
The combination of exclusive rights and an aggressive patent li-
censing strategy subsequently caused a tremendous backlash 
among scientific researchers over the OncoMouse. The private 
firm, DuPont, had funded the research at Harvard, and under the 
                                                                                                                            
127 Id. at 43–44. 
128 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1073 (2008). 
129 MPEP § 2105 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015) (“Shortly after the Allen decision, the 
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks issued a notice that the Patent and Trademark 
Office would now consider nonnaturally occurring, nonhuman multicellular living 
organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject matter within the scope of 35 
U.S.C. § 101.”) (internal citations omitted). 
130 U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988). 
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terms of the funding agreement, Harvard licensed the technology 
to DuPont on an exclusive basis.131 But instead of selling the mice 
to researchers, DuPont licensed use of the mice on terms that al-
lowed DuPont to control future scientific inquiry and retain intel-
lectual property rights in future discoveries flowing from the li-
censed use, a practice that caused considerable controversy in the 
research community.132 Disputes over DuPont’s licensing strategy 
escalated throughout the 1990s until the National Institutes of 
Health (“NIH”) negotiated several memoranda of understanding 
in 1998 and 1999 that produced, at best, an uneasy peace. These 
memoranda generally made the OncoMouse available to academic 
researchers on a royalty-free basis with no reach-through rights on 
subsequent innovations. 
During debates over codification of the research exemption in 
the PCTIA, John Pratt, on behalf of the Association of Indepen-
dent Research Institutes, argued that the OncoMouse controversy 
made the research exemption an important problem deserving con-
gressional action. According to Pratt, inventions like the Onco-
Mouse were essential research tools, and allowing patents on such 
tools gave the patent holder the power to stop researchers from 
making such tools in their own lab.133 Pratt also argued that patent 
holders have already started using licensing techniques to control 
the direction, and appropriate the results of, research using basic 
tools like the OncoMouse (which Pratt accurately described as “an 
attempt to artificially extend the patent holder’s rights beyond the 
scope of the invention”).134 
Interestingly, social scientists have used the “openness” shock 
created by the NIH memoranda to study the impact that DuPont’s 
aggressive licensing practices had on innovation outcomes.135 The 
authors took advantage of the fact that every genetically engineered 
mouse, including those patented by DuPont, is associated with a 
publication describing its development and characteristics (a 
                                                                                                                            
131 Eisenberg, supra note 128, at 1072–73. 
132 Id. at 1074. 
133 1989 Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act Hearing, supra note 122, at 276–78. 
134 Id. 
135 Fiona Murray et al., Of Mice and Academics: Examining the Effect of Openness on 
Innovation 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14819, 2009). 
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“mouse-article”). This allowed the authors to study the level and 
nature of follow-on research for each kind of mouse by analyzing 
the number and nature of subsequent research publications citing 
to the original mouse-article.136 Overall, the authors found that the 
NIH agreements increased annual citation rates to mouse-articles 
by twenty-one percent,137 while new authors increased by twenty-
two to twenty-five percent, new keywords by twenty-five percent, 
and new journals by twenty-four percent.138 The authors inter-
preted the results as yet more proof for the view that such licensing 
strategies decrease research intensity and force researchers to 
choose different research paths, while openness increases research 
intensity.139 Subsequent economic studies suggest that the effect is 
felt in a wide variety of industries and is not confined to biotech-
nology.140 
H. The Federal Circuit’s Final Assault on the Research Exemption: 
Embrex (2000), Madey (2002), and Merck (2003) 
Congress’ failure to codify a research exemption in the PCTIA 
cleared the path for the Federal Circuit to resuscitate its interpreta-
tion of the common law research exemption as “truly narrow.” 
The Federal Circuit made its first move in this direction in a 2000 
decision. In Embrex v. Service Engineering Corp., the court was faced 
with the question of whether substantial evidence supported a jury 
verdict finding that the research exemption did not apply to certain 
experiments that the defendant had performed in an attempt to de-
sign around the plaintiff’s invention.141 In a per curiam opinion, the 
court affirmed the jury’s finding that the defendant had performed 
the experiments “expressly for commercial purposes” and that the 
                                                                                                                            
136 Id. at 4. 
137 Id. at 23. 
138 Id. at 24–26. 
139 Id. at 23. 
140 Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal 
Evidence from the Courts 3–4, 34–35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
20269, 2014) (finding that a decision invalidating a patent causes, on average, “a [fifty] 
percent increase in subsequent citations to the focal patent,” but that the effect is 
concentrated in fields characterized as technologically complex and having highly 
fragmented patent ownership). 
141 Embrex v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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research exemption therefore did not apply.142 The court argued 
that the common law research exemption remained a “very nar-
row” doctrine as set forth in Bolar, and that the Hatch-Waxman 
Act had not wholly repealed Bolar but had only superseded the de-
cision “on other grounds.”143 Judge Rader wrote a separate con-
curring opinion to state his own belief that an un-related Supreme 
Court opinion144 had precluded any further application of the re-
search exemption, and that even if the doctrine “retains some lin-
gering vitality, the slightest commercial implication will render the 
[doctrine] inapplicable.”145 
In Madey v. Duke University, the Federal Circuit made its next 
move towards rendering the common law research exemption in-
applicable in all but the narrowest of circumstances.146 In this case, 
physics professor John Madey sued his former employer, Duke 
University, alleging that Duke had infringed Madey’s patents cov-
ering three pieces of equipment in Duke’s Free Electron Laser la-
boratory.147 Madey had moved his equipment from Stanford to 
Duke when Duke recruited him, but left the equipment behind nine 
years later when Duke removed Madey from his position as lab di-
rector.148 Duke then continued to use the equipment, causing Ma-
dey to sue.149 
The district court granted summary judgment in Duke’s favor 
on grounds that Duke’s use of the patented equipment fell within 
the research exemption announced in Whittemore,150 but the Feder-
al Circuit reversed. The Federal Circuit described its ruling as a 
                                                                                                                            
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 1349. 
144 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). In the 
opinion, the Supreme Court simply held that evidence of experimentation is not relevant 
to the separate inquiry of whether an accused product infringes under the doctrine of 
equivalents, since the established test is an objective one and does not consider subjective 
intent. See id. at 35–36. Judge Rader argued that this decision precluded consideration of 
intent in any patent doctrine, including the research exemption. Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1353 
(Rader, J., concurring). 
145 Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1353. 
146 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
147 Id. at 1353. 
148 Id. at 1352. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 1355. 
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natural outgrowth of binding precedent: “Our precedent, to which 
we are bound, continues to recognize the judicially created experi-
mental use defense, however, in a very limited form.”151 The court 
was referring to its decision in Bolar.152 According to the Federal 
Circuit, the fundamental inquiry was not whether the use of a pa-
tented invention for research constituted a socially beneficial use 
that Congress never intended to punish. Instead, the Federal Cir-
cuit reframed the question as being whether the use was in further-
ance of “the institution’s legitimate business objectives,” and 
since universities are in the business of research and education, any 
use in furtherance of that purpose is patent infringement, regard-
less of whether the university is a non-profit institution or not.153 
With that somewhat circular reasoning, the Federal Circuit effec-
tively rendered the research exemption an almost meaningless doc-
trine. 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Madey,154 but agreed to 
hear a case shortly thereafter (Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, 
Ltd.) in which the Federal Circuit attempted to further undermine 
the Bolar amendment.155 As indicated above, the Bolar amendment 
protects experimental uses of a drug patent “solely for purposes 
reasonably related to the development and submission of informa-
tion under a Federal law.”156 In Merck, the issue on appeal was 
whether that safe harbor protected early-stage experiments that did 
not immediately result in an FDA submission, but instead allowed 
the experimenter to identify “the best drug candidate to subject to 
future clinical testing under FDA processes.”157 The Federal Cir-
cuit held that the safe harbor did not protect such uses, arguing 
that the safe harbor “does not reach any exploratory research that 
rationally form only a predicate for future FDA clinical tests.”158 In 
                                                                                                                            
151 Id. at 1360. 
152 Id. at 1361 (concluding that “the experimental use defense persists albeit in the very 
narrow form articulated by this court in Embrex . . . and in [Bolar]”). 
153 Id. at 1362. 
154 Duke Univ. v. Madey, 539 U.S. 958 (2003). 
155 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
156 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2012). 
157 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 865 (Fed. Cir. 2003), 
vacated, 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
158 Id. at 867. 
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a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme 
Court reversed, finding that the scope of the safe harbor was much 
broader.159 The Court held that “[t]here is simply no room in the 
statute for excluding certain information from the exemption on 
the basis of the phase of research in which it is developed or the 
particular submission in which it could be included.”160 
This decision indicates that a broad research exemption—
much broader than the historical form of the common law exemp-
tion—is legally defensible, and if Congress extended the protection 
currently afforded to drug researchers to other technological fields, 
that legislation would more likely than not survive judicial scrutiny. 
Recent economic studies might support such a policy shift. For ex-
ample, in a major recent study evaluating how a Federal Circuit 
decision of invalidity impacts the number of citations to the focal 
patent, the authors found that in many technological fields, such a 
decision increases citations (suggesting that openness increases 
innovation), but found no impact in the case of pharmaceuticals.161 
Coincidentally, pharmaceutical research benefited from a strong 
statutory research exemption, pursuant to the Bolar amendment 
and the Merck decision, during almost the entire time frame that 
the authors investigated.162 
I. Impeding Research for a Public Purpose: The Dispute Over 
Genetically Modified Plants (2009) 
After the OncoMouse dispute, the second major controversy 
related to the research exemption arose over access to genetically 
modified plants, and it suggests a different dimension to the prob-
lem that society faces when patent holders control the course of 
future research. As Cornell entomologist Elson J. Shields revealed 
in a 2009 letter to the Environmental Protection Agency, agricul-
tural technology companies in the United States were, at the time, 
using licensing restrictions (similar to those used by DuPont) not to 
                                                                                                                            
159 Merck, 545 U.S. at 202. 
160 Id. 
161 Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 140, at 26. 
162 The data set includes all decisions involving issues of patent validity from 1982 until 
December 2008. Id. at 10–11. The Bolar Amendment was passed in 1984. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(1) (2012). 
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capture rights in future research, but to prevent research into the 
health and environmental consequences of genetically modified 
plants.163 Not only did the companies prohibit use of seeds for re-
search in their standard license agreements, they also stopped re-
search they had previously allowed from being published if the re-
sults were contrary to the companies’ business interests, and selec-
tively chose researchers based on their perception of who was 
“friendly” to agribusiness.164 The dispute was more or less re-
solved on an ad hoc basis when the American Seed Trade Associa-
tion conceded some ground in the wake of public outrage over the 
Shields’ letter, though an online report from 2010 noted that 
“questions remain over whether—and how soon—[the agreement] 
will alter what has been a research environment rife with obstruc-
tions and suspicion.”165 
In this specific setting, the researchers seeking access to the pa-
tented invention were not attempting to advance the science of ge-
netically modified crops (in competition with the patent holder) or 
use the invention to develop new plants with potential market val-
ue. Instead, the researchers were seeking access to the patented 
plant material in order to evaluate the health and environmental 
consequences of genetically modified crops, an issue of interest to 
public health and food safety officials and society at large. The con-
troversy therefore provides a stark reminder that not all science 
seeks to advance the technological frontier; much scientific re-
search seeks to ensure that existing technologies are safe for public 
use or consumption. Without equitable doctrines like a research 
exemption, patent holders have a great deal of power to control the 
                                                                                                                            
163 Do Seed Companies Control GM Crop Research?, SCI. AM. (Aug. 1, 2009), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-seed-companies-control-gm-crop-
research/ [https://perma.cc/9XZH-HKLC]. 
164 Id.; see also Kevin Rodkey, Exhaustion and Validity of Single-Use Licenses for 
Transgenic Seeds in the Wake of Quanta v. LG Electronics, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 579, 585 
(2010) (noting that one firm’s standard license allowed use of the seed “for planting a 
single crop only in single season,” and prohibiting the licensee from “provid[ing] it to 
anyone for crop breeding, research, generation of herbicide registration data or seed 
production”). 
165 Bruce Stutz, Companies Put Restrictions On Research Into GM Crops, YALE ENV’T 360 
(May 13, 2010), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/companies_put_restrictions_on_research 
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nature and quality of information that public officials rely on to 
make public policy and guard the public’s safety. 
J. Disputes Over Gene Patents in Medical Research and the Myriad 
Genetics Decision (2013) 
The third major patenting controversy that implicated the re-
search exemption involved the patenting of genes or isolated DNA 
sequences. In the 1990s, many biomedical researchers became in-
creasingly concerned about the PTOs practice of issuing patents on 
human genes. As a result, in 2001, the PTO proposed guidelines 
clarifying that it would issue patents on human DNA sequences so 
long as the applicant proved that the discovered sequence was suf-
ficiently useful, which eliminated the practice of applying for a pa-
tent based on the DNA sequence alone.166 Yet the question re-
mained: could biomedical researchers use patented DNA se-
quences in the laboratory to conduct research without infringing 
gene patents? 
To address the problem, Representative Lynn Rivers intro-
duced a bill during the 107th Congress, the Genomic Research and 
Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002 (“GRDA”),167 to create a 
form of exemption for genetic research. The GRDA proposed to 
allow all persons or entities, except those involved in the sale of 
pharmaceuticals, to freely use “genetic sequence information for 
purposes of research.”168 It also proposed to add genetic testing 
(diagnostic, prognostic, and predictive) to the types of “medical 
activities” that have immunity under the patent laws.169 Finally, it 
proposed to amend the Bayh-Dole Act so that a government con-
tractor must notify the public if it seeks a patent on genetic se-
quence information.170 
In her speech in support of the bill, Representative Rivers de-
scribed a quandary that would later become a central aspect of a 
2013 Supreme Court decision regarding the patentability of 
                                                                                                                            
166 Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-02 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
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DNA.171 Specifically, she emphasized that the power to prevent 
scientists from doing research on genes seemed strange given that 
those genes exist within the human body. Rivers recounted a dis-
pute that had arisen with Miami Children’s Hospital where the 
hospital had used tissue samples from children dying of Canavan 
disease to identify the gene responsible for their condition, and 
then patented the gene and used the patent to prevent others from 
researching a cure or diagnosing children without paying a royal-
ty.172 Instead of proposing that genes not be patentable, Represent-
ative Rivers simply proposed that the patent law be balanced with 
exemptions for research and medical testing.173 The bill was re-
ferred to the House Judiciary Committee on the day it was intro-
duced, but no further action was taken. 
In 2013, the Supreme Court decided that isolated DNA se-
quences are not patentable174 in a judicial dispute that highlights 
the problem with allowing patent owners to dictate the course of 
medical research. The defendant in the case, Myriad Genetics, had 
successfully patented the isolated DNA sequences for genes in 
which mutations are strongly correlated with a risk of developing 
breast and ovarian cancer (the BRCA genes).175 Subsequently, the 
company took action to prevent all other clinical researchers from 
testing to determine if an individual or patient carried such a muta-
tion.176 In addition to stopping those who carry out diagnostic tests, 
the patents also created obstacles to those engaged in breast and 
ovarian cancer research (as opposed to treating physicians), as re-
searchers must rule out BRCA causation in order to provide a valid 
                                                                                                                            
171 148 CONG. REC. E353-03 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002) (“What does it mean to own a 
human gene patent? It means that the gene patent holder controls any use of ‘its’ gene, a 
gene that is found in virtually every human being on the planet. The patent holder can 
prevent my doctor from looking in my body to see if I have that gene. The patent holder 
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gene therapy based on that gene.”). Rivers also noted complaints against Myriad’s high 
licensing fees for breast and ovarian cancer diagnostics. See id. at E354. 
172 Id. at E353. 
173 Id. at E354. 
174 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
175 Id. at 2114 (noting that through litigation and cease and desist letters, Myriad 
“solidified its position as the only entity providing BRCA testing”). 
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scientific opinion as to alternative causes.177 Myriad took the posi-
tion that such experiments constituted infringing uses of its pa-
tents, and required researchers to pay royalties to conduct such 
research.178 
By holding that isolated DNA sequences are not patentable, the 
Supreme Court provided much needed relief to genetic research-
ers, and it is clear from the Court’s reasoning that it intended to do 
so. For example, the Court noted that the categories of ineligible 
subject matter are “the basic tools of scientific and technological 
work,” and without these limitations on eligible subject matter, 
“there would be considerable danger that the grant of patents 
would ‘tie up’ the use of such tools and thereby ‘inhibit future in-
novation premised upon them.’”179 In short, the Court was trying 
to protect the types of research activity that historically found pro-
tection under the common law research exemption. But the Court 
attempted to achieve that result through a legal doctrine that is 
much more complex and difficult to administer—that of subject 
matter eligibility—because it revolves around defining abstract cat-
egories of exempted subject matter rather than on protected types 
of activity. One way of interpreting the decision, then, is that the 
Federal Circuit’s attack on the common law research exemption 
has forced the judicial system to seek refuge in other legal doctrines 
in order to provide more balance in the patent law. 
II. ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY, INSTITUTIONAL BIAS, AND THE 
RESEARCH EXEMPTION 
As the historical discussion above reveals, there is no single 
“research exemption” in American patent law. Rather, the law in 
this area is incredibly complex. All researchers, regardless of insti-
tutional setting, have fairly broad protection from infringement lia-
bility when the experimentation is for the development of a drug or 
medical device that will require FDA approval. Also, researchers at 
                                                                                                                            
177 Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an 
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state agencies and universities remain protected from any in-
fringement liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. But 
the Federal Circuit has significantly narrowed the reach of the 
common law research exemption, which is not limited to any spe-
cific subject matter or institutional setting. A series of legal devel-
opments have rendered the statutory exemption in the PVPA for 
sexually reproduced plants a dead-letter law. It still exists on the 
books, but those who innovate in that setting will rarely choose the 
PVPA over the Patent Act. And the Supreme Court has more ag-
gressively narrowed (or policed) the boundaries of subject matter 
eligibility in order to provide some of the same relief that a broad 
research exemption would provide. 
The law in this area has evolved in such a complex fashion be-
cause of politics. For the last forty years, powerful economic inter-
ests have exerted significant influence on federal patent policy, and 
powerful economic ideas have significantly influenced the way in 
which policymakers across the federal government frame debates 
over patent policy. The research exemption provides a robust case 
study for analyzing these trends, and bolsters two of the major cri-
tiques in the literature on the political economy of patent policy: 
first, that much of patent policymaking since the middle of the 
1970s is rooted in faulty economic ideology; second, that the Fed-
eral Circuit, a specialized court created in part to be the standard-
bearer of that ideology, exhibits an institutional bias in favor of 
strengthening patent rights and weakening doctrines (like the re-
search exemption) that provide equitable counter-balances to 
strong patent rights. 
A. The Role of Economic Ideology in Contemporary Patent Policy 
One of the most striking features in legislative debates over the 
research exemption is that those who have historically opposed the 
exemption have relied almost exclusively on one idea—the “cen-
tral dogma” of patent law—to support their position. The basic 
hypothesis, repeated throughout the debates, is that the prospect of 
patent protection is the primary if not the sole reason that institu-
tions invest in research and innovation, and as a result, any attempt 
to diminish the “incentives” that patents create (such as by ex-
empting research activity) will necessarily lead to less innovation 
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and hurt the economy. Though individual firms and industry rep-
resentatives often invoke a version of the central dogma to create 
an air of legitimacy when seeking government patronage, the dog-
ma is really a systemic claim about the extent to which a given pa-
tent policy will, on balance, increase overall levels of investment 
and innovation across all technological settings and industries, ir-
respective of the impact on one or a few actors. 
The main problem with the central dogma is that, despite sixty 
years of inquiry, there is no quantitative evidence that the existing 
patent system has encouraged or incentivized more innovation in 
the United States than would otherwise exist under a different sys-
tem, such as one including a robust research exemption.180 As Re-
becca Eisenberg observed early on, the central dogma fails to an-
swer “the empirical question of how much incentive is necessary 
for an optimal level of invention and disclosure,” and is therefore 
of little use in determining whether or not a policy like the research 
exemption is sound.181 
On this point, the political history of the research exemption il-
lustrates in detail a major trend in the political economy of patent 
law since the 1970s. As economist William Landes and Judge Ri-
chard Posner have argued, since about 1976, patent rights have 
greatly expanded because government actors and private firms un-
flinchingly believed that whatever the reigning free-market ideolo-
gy said about private property must also be true about intellectual 
property.182 This analytical mistake is found repeatedly in the his-
tory of the research exemption. The idea that patents incentivize 
innovation is just a repackaged version of the fundamental principle 
that private property rights provide incentives for socially benefi-
                                                                                                                            
180 See Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 
1, 5 (Winter 2013) (finding “weak or no evidence that strengthening patent regimes 
increases innovation,” based on a review of twenty-four separate studies); Adam B. Jaffe, 
The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the Innovation Process, 29 RES. 
POL’Y 531, 555 (2000) (concluding that the theoretical and empirical evidence 
increasingly shows that the costs of stronger patent protection may exceed the benefits, 
especially if resources that could be dedicated to innovation are tied up in litigation over 
patents); Scherer, supra note 4, at 171–75. 
181 Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1030. 
182 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 22–23. 
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cial economic activity.183 And the unquestioning belief that this 
principle applies to intellectual property, without any proof that it 
is true or any serious discussion of the destructive potential inhe-
rent in patents, has created a system that gives patent holders a 
great deal of power to squelch, control, and delay the very research 
and innovation that the patent system is meant to promote. 
Economists and social scientists are changing the ways they 
model the patent system to correct for inadequacies in the models 
that led to the development of the central dogma. The hypothesis 
that patents incentivize innovation acquired a great deal of legiti-
macy from economic models developed in the 1950s, models that 
described a limited field of investment behavior, namely private 
investments in technological fields where copying is easy and cheap 
and where other economic advantages, like first mover advantages, 
are not significant. Those models also assumed that invention takes 
place in “isolated” settings rather than in “cumulative” contexts 
where patented inventions are not just outputs but are inputs to fur-
ther research. As a result, when addressing the economic pitfalls of 
stronger patent protection in debates over the research exemption, 
economists and policymakers who relied on these models in prior 
decades tended to focus on the traditional problems associated with 
monopoly power, like restricted output and high prices on com-
mercial goods that necessarily follow from reduced competition, 
rather than on the power to control and prevent further experimen-
tation and product development.184 In the early 1990s, a handful of 
lawyers and economists realized that the motivating assumptions in 
the early models did not accurately describe the modern research 
setting.185 As a result, more modern theories account for the fact 
that levels of follow-on innovation will be lower than socially desir-
able when any of the traditional microeconomic assumptions 
breakdown (asymmetric information, high transaction costs, or 
                                                                                                                            
183 See id. at 22 (“Markets and property rights go hand in hand. Property rights provide 
the basic incentives for private economic activity and the starting point for transactions 
whereby resources are shifted to their most valuable use.”). 
184 Bhaven Sampat & Heidi Williams, How Do Patents Affect Follow-on Innovation? 
Evidence from the Human Genome 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
21666, 2015). 
185 Merges & Nelson, supra note 120, at 842–44; Scotchmer, supra note 120, at 30. 
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coordination problems) and lead to bargaining failures over access 
to existing innovations.186 
As the history of the research exemption shows, the way in 
which economists analyze the costs and benefits of the patent sys-
tem has not only influenced patent legislation, but has also im-
pacted the way in which jurists conceive of the patent system. 
When the Supreme Court indicated, in 1989, that the patent sys-
tem “reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation 
and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without 
any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful 
Arts’” it was simply importing the then-standard economic justifi-
cation for the patent system into the meaning of the constitutional 
mandate.187 More recently, the Supreme Court has suggested that 
“[p]atent protection strikes a delicate balance between creating 
‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery’ and 
‘imped[ing] the flow of information that might permit, indeed 
spur, invention.’”188 This subtle shift in the Court’s exposition of 
the patent system’s purposes—from a concern about the danger of 
monopoly power to the danger of impeding the flow of informa-
tion—shows an awareness of the ways in which economic models 
of innovation are changing.189 At the same time, no legal principle 
requires that the constitutional mandate take on such a purely eco-
nomic meaning, and history suggests that judges should be wary of 
make those kinds of intellectual leaps.190 Any analysis based on 
                                                                                                                            
186 Sampat & Williams, supra note 184, at 1–2; see also Galasso & Schankerman, supra 
note 140, at 2-4. 
187 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989). 
188 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2109 (2013) 
(quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 
(2012)). 
189 At least three justices—Breyer, Stevens, and Souter—are well aware of the problem. 
See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126–27 (2006) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Rather, the reason for the exclusion is that sometimes too 
much patent protection can impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts,’ the constitutional objective of patent and copyright protection. The problem 
arises from the fact that patents do not only encourage research by providing monetary 
incentives for invention. Sometimes their presence can discourage research by impeding 
the free exchange of information.”). 
190 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that it 
perverts the Constitution to import the principles of free-market capitalism and Social 
Darwinism into the meaning of the Due Process Clause). 
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standard microeconomic assumptions will necessarily exclude con-
siderations of equity that are important in a legal setting; any static 
equilibrium model will say little about how to facilitate the kind of 
dynamic change that is called for in the constitutional command to 
“promote the progress of science and the useful arts.” 
The power of the central dogma, however, flows not only from 
its influence on judicial attitudes towards the patent system, but 
also from the pervasive hold it has had in legislative debates. Vir-
tually every Congressional debate from the PVPA to Bayh-Dole, 
Hatch-Waxman, and the PCTIA has taken place under the pre-
sumption that strong patent rights provide an almost unmitigated 
social benefit with virtually no costs or risks. Executive officials in 
the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations more or less es-
poused that same view, as their testimony makes clear.191 Even 
when Congress anticipated that patents could be used in a way that 
risked causing harm to public health and safety during the Bayh-
Dole debates, it constructed an onerous set of safeguards to protect 
against those risks.192 But as the controversies surrounding the On-
coMouse, genetically modified plants and seeds, and the BRCA 
genes suggest, these risks are increasingly becoming routine and 
their resolution is demanding more and more government re-
sources.193 Except for the House Judiciary Committee report on 
the proposal to codify a research exemption as part of the PCTIA, 
no government agency has thoroughly considered the larger set of 
risks (beyond monopoly power and health and safety concerns) 
that flow from the proliferation of patent rights and licensing prac-
tices aimed at suppressing innovation. 
Those who advocated in favor of research exemptions did not 
adhere so rigidly to economic dogma, and proposed a variety of 
reasons why a robust exemption is needed as a matter of public pol-
icy. Experimentation is arguably a type of conduct that no Con-
gress has ever intended to punish. In a post-Bayh-Dole world, the 
research exemption would also allow public and private researchers 
to buttress their research budgets with additional revenue from 
commercial sales, while immunizing the underlying activity that 
                                                                                                                            
191 See, e.g., text accompanying supra notes 21, 69, 95, 119–21, 123. 
192 See supra Section I.C. 
193 See supra Sections I.G, I.I, I.J. 
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promotes technological progress for the benefit of all. It might mi-
nimize and in some cases eliminate transaction costs associated 
with research activity, thus removing a significant tax on research. 
It would normalize, to a degree, the impact that the patent law has 
on private and public universities, the latter being protected under 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity while the former is not. It 
should provide an important check on the ability of patent holders 
to extend the temporal and substantive scope of their patent 
beyond the boundaries of the initial grant. It would protect the abil-
ity of researchers to study the health and environmental conse-
quences of new technologies in the marketplace without undue in-
terference. And it may prevent the outsourcing of research, given 
that most advanced economies have adopted an exemption in one 
form or another. All of these arguments have been raised in favor of 
a research exemption. 
The debates over the research exemption also demonstrate just 
how much of modern patent policy is born of a perceived need to 
use patents to promote the ability of domestic firms to compete in 
an increasingly global economy. The PVPA of 1970 (and its re-
search exemption) was born of a desire to help domestic agricultur-
al firms compete with European business, the Bayh-Dole Act was 
avowedly meant to increase the productivity of American business-
es so that they can compete with firms in Japan and elsewhere, and 
the TRIPS agreement and the attempt to repeal state sovereign 
immunity at home were related efforts to get foreign firms to con-
form to U.S. patent standards. In a sense, then, the political history 
of the exemption also illustrates the impact that globalization had, 
in this time frame, on economic thinking about patents and mono-
poly power. As David Hart puts it, “[p]olicies that had previously 
been seen in the national market to be concentrationist, fostering 
collusion to suppress innovation, came to be seen as deconcentra-
tionist in the global market, overcoming collective action problems 
that inhibited innovation.”194 From this perspective, the central 
dogma was never intended to be an empirically defensible claim 
about innovation; it was just a veneer used to legitimate policies 
that allowed incumbent firms to acquire more economic power and 
                                                                                                                            
194 David M. Hart, Antitrust and Technological Innovation in the U.S.: Ideas, Institutions, 
Decisions, and Impacts, 1890–2000, 30 RES. POL’Y 923, 930 (2001). 
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which insulated domestic firms, to a degree, from foreign competi-
tion. 
As indicated above, the central dogma—the basis for so much 
patent policy in the 1970s and 1980s—did not go unchallenged for-
ever. Unfortunately, by the time these challenges began to appear, 
the last major political opportunity for codifying a broad exemption 
(as part of the PCTIA195) had passed. With no congressional debate 
or action on the subject for the next twenty-five years, the locus of 
debate shifted back to the Federal Circuit. 
B. Institutional Bias at the Federal Circuit 
Another prominent critique in the study of the political econo-
my of patent policy is that the Federal Circuit, as a specialized 
court, exhibits an institutional bias in its decision-making and is 
prone to a subtle form of regulatory capture.196 Landes and Posner, 
for example, argue that “a specialized court is more likely to have a 
‘mission’ orientation than a generalist court,” that the Federal 
Circuit “has defined its mission as promoting technological 
progress by enlarging patent rights,” and that the Federal Circuit 
exhibits a strong bias in favor of enlarging patent rights and increas-
ing the demand for services from its primary constituency: patent 
lawyers.197 Scherer emphasizes that this concern was very much 
present at the time of the court’s creation and that, in the enabling 
legislation, Congress ignored warnings that such a specialist court 
“may be ‘captured’ by special interest groups” and that uniformity 
in federal patent law “is quite plainly not a desirable objective.”198 
The Federal Circuit has unquestionably exhibited an institu-
tional bias against doctrines like the research exemption. The court 
                                                                                                                            
195 H.R. REP. NO. 101-960(I), at 41 (1990). 
196 The mechanism might best be characterized as one of “cultural capture,” a channel 
for obtaining regulatory actions that serve private industry but which “operates through a 
set of shared but not explicitly stated understandings about the world.” James Kwak, 
Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL 
INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 79 (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., 
2013). 
197 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 26–27. 
198 Scherer, supra note 4, at 187–88 (quoting Commission on Revision of the Federal Court 
Appellate System Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 
195, 236 (1975)). 
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first attempted to eliminate the reach of the common law research 
exemption in the context of pharmaceutical patents in Bolar (1984). 
Though Congress swiftly rejected that action by creating a statuto-
ry exemption for research connected to FDA submissions, the 
Federal Circuit remained committed to its original view and essen-
tially eliminated what was left of the common law exemption (as 
applied to other technological domains) in Embrex (2000) and Ma-
dey (2002). The court has also been receptive to arguments that 
Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity from 
infringement liability in a patent context (Florida Prepaid, 1998), 
and even attempted to narrow the scope of the Bolar exemption in 
Merck (2003). All of these actions are consistent with a strong ideo-
logical commitment to eliminating or narrowing immunities and 
exemptions from infringement liability, even those that have a firm 
statutory basis. 
Part of the explanation may lie in the fact that Congress has ef-
fectively delegated policymaking power to a judicial venue where 
judges are bound to follow precedent and do not readily embrace a 
policymaking role. Congress explicitly created the Federal Circuit 
“to strengthen the United States patent system in such a way as to 
foster technological growth and industrial innovation” and to 
“provide nationwide uniformity in patent law.”199 And yet, some 
of the judges have indicated that they have difficulty achieving 
those objectives within the confines of their institutional setting. 
Judge Michel has publicly lamented the court’s insularity and de-
scribed its process as an echo chamber, while Judge Rader has de-
cried the fact that the court’s institutional arrangement seems to 
stunt the pace of common law development.200 When faced with 
criticism that the court does not incorporate social science scholar-
ship in their decision-making, some of the judges (including Mi-
chel) defaulted to the traditional view that federal courts do not set 
policy but simply apply existing law to the facts.201 
At the same time, none of the Court’s decisions concerning the 
research exemption appear to rest on such firm precedent that the 
                                                                                                                            
199 H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 4 (1981). 
200 Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 
NW. U.L. REV. 1619, 1622 (2007). 
201 Id. at 1648 n.102. 
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Federal Circuit can reasonably claim to have had its hand forced. In 
two of the six decisions (Florida Prepaid and Merck), the Supreme 
Court actually reversed the Federal Circuit. In a third decision (Bo-
lar), the Federal Circuit showed some selection bias in choosing 
what precedent to rely on, and ultimately precipitated a congres-
sional repeal—an uncommon event in patent law. Though the two 
most recent opinions narrowing the common law research exemp-
tion (Embrex and Madey) have evaded Supreme Court review, nei-
ther seems to have indisputably firm roots in legal precedent, espe-
cially since both effectively rely on Bolar. 
Factors like the timing of the judicial appointment (before or af-
ter the creation of the Federal Circuit) or the political affiliation of 
the appointing president do not persuasively explain the court’s 
institutional bias in the small set of decisions considered in this pa-
per. As the table below shows, though five of the six panels were 
composed of judges appointed independently to the Federal Cir-
cuit after 1982, the one exception—Bolar—is the opening salvo in 
the court’s attempts to narrow or eliminate the common law re-
search exemption. The political affiliation of the appointing presi-
dent also seems to have played an ambiguous role, despite the 
strong presence of Republican-appointees on the court. Five of the 
six panels were composed of at least two judges appointed by Re-
publican presidents, but the one exception—Madey—arguably 















Howard Markey Nixon 1972 to CCPA (R) Yes 
Philip Nichols, Jr. Johnson 1966 to COC (D) No 
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Alan D. Lourie W. Bush 1990 (R) Yes 
Raymond C. 
Clevenger, III 
H.W. Bush 1990 (R) No 
Randall R. Rader 
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Reagan 1982 to COC, 
1987 to Fed. Cir. (R) 
No 
Pauline Newman Reagan 1984 (R) Yes 
Alan D. Lourie W. Bush 1990 (R) Yes 
Madey206 
William Bryson Clinton 1994 (D) No 
Arthur Gajarsa Clinton 1997 (D) Yes 
Richard Linn Clinton 1999 (D) Yes 
Merck207 
Pauline Newman 
(concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) 
Reagan 1984 (R) Yes 
Randall R. Rader Reagan 1988 (R) Yes 
Sharon Prost W. Bush 2001 (R) No 
 
A stronger case could be made for the idea that judges with a 
patent background—and all the ideological baggage that comes 
with it—are biased against doctrines like the research exemption, 
at least from the year 2000 forward. Even more notable is the 
                                                                                                                            
203 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
204 Embrex v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curium). 
205 Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). 
206 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
207 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 
545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
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prominent presence in the decisions of those who were affiliated 
with the court’s founding; though even here, specific individuals 
amongst the subset of those affiliated with the court’s founding 
have exhibited strong ideological bias against the research exemp-
tion, while others have offered strong support. Judge Markey, then 
a judge on the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, ultimately 
testified in favor of creating the Federal Circuit. Before doing so, 
he argued that the main problem with obtaining consistency in the 
patent law was the federal courts’ frequent reliance upon judicial 
tests that were not rooted in statutory language.208 That critique 
suggests that Judge Markey believed the common law should de-
velop in a very restricted manner in the context of patent cases. 
Judge Rader served on the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee in the 
1980s, during the time that the bill to establish the Federal Circuit 
was being debated, and since his appointment to the court, he has 
taken a very strident view towards the research exemption. In both 
Embrex and Merck, Judge Rader articulated perhaps the strongest 
ideological bias against the research exemption (in both common 
law and statutory forms).209 Judge Newman played a role in orga-
nizing corporate patent counsel to lobby Congress when the bill to 
create the Federal Circuit was stalled.210 At the same time, she has 
also provided one of the strongest defenses of the research exemp-
tion on the judicial record.211 
Consistent with other studies that look for institutional bias at 
the Federal Circuit in the development of doctrine,212 the history of 
debates over the research exemption illustrate a significant institu-
                                                                                                                            
208 Paul M. Janicke, To Be or Not to Be: The Long Gestation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
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211 Merck, 331 F.3d at 872–78 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
212 See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in 
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); Nard & Duffy, supra note 200. 
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tional bias against common law exemptions and immunities, a bias 
that seems to originate from shared understandings and ideologies 
about the way the patent system works and the Federal Circuit’s 
role in shaping patent law. But the history of the research exemp-
tion also suggests some deeper problems associated with the dele-
gation of policymaking authority to a judicial forum where the ideo-
logical biases of certain individuals can be significantly amplified, 
and where policy is made without the benefit of public hearing, fact 
gathering, and debate that goes beyond the interests of the private 
litigants. 
CONCLUSION 
The temporal evolution in federal policy concerning the idea of 
exempting research activity from infringement liability provides an 
interesting case study in the political economy of patent policy, one 
that illustrates two of the main themes in the field. The un-nuanced 
economic ideology that pervades legislative debates over the re-
search exemption, embodied in the central dogma, appears to have 
influenced a great deal of judicial and legislative analysis of patent 
policy over the course of the last forty years. The implantation of 
this ideology into the Patent Clause of the Constitution is cause for 
special concern because it means that almost all legal analysis of the 
patent system takes place under an analytical framework that is 
wholly unconcerned with questions of equity, protecting public 
health and safety, or promoting progress (divorced from profit), 
and which leaves very little room for integrating patent law with 
the objectives of other economic policy domains. 
The Federal Circuit has a fairly strong institutional bias against 
liability exemptions and immunities. One plausible explanation for 
that bias is that Congress created the Federal Circuit with a specific 
mission, one rooted in certain ideological precepts about the role of 
the patent system in the American economy and the role of the 
judges in strengthening that system, and that this ideological 
framework favors expanding and strengthening rights of individual 
patent holders rather than strengthening the innovative capacity of 
the system as a whole. This ideological bias may be exacerbated by 
the fact that much policy, in this area, is made in an institutional 
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setting that hears individual disputes and does not (always) em-
brace the idea of itself as an institution responsible for setting sys-
temic policy. 
A temporal or chronological approach to studying the political 
economy of patent policy provides certain benefits over more ex-
pansive, systemic studies. Among those benefits is the ability to 
embed attitudes towards a specific policy within historical context, 
and examine the relationship between the policy and other related 
developments in the broader domain of patent law. The perspec-
tives of those who opposed or supported the research exemption 
did not develop in isolation. At the very least, those opinions were 
shaped by the economic recession of the late 1970s, concerns about 
the competitiveness of American industry in a global economy, in-
ternational debates over patent standards, judicial developments 
regarding sovereign immunity, and a whole host of developments 
regarding patent eligible subject matter. Such an approach also re-
veals how the constituencies of advocates for and opponents to the 
research exemption change with time. For example, the shift from 
opposition to support amongst some groups of patent lawyers, and 
the surprising emergence of strident opposition from university 
officials, is much more visible in this type of vertical, issue-specific 
analysis. 
Though the political history of the research exemption provides 
much fuel for skeptics about the real benefits of patent law, the 
news is not all bad. Granted, the complexity of policymaking in this 
area and the contingencies of history have led to an unnecessarily 
complicated legal framework when it comes to the research exemp-
tion. And much of the political history told herein proves that those 
with economic power and an interest in perpetuating the status quo 
are, predictably, very good at getting at what they want. But Con-
gress has on two separate occasions enacted some form of a statu-
tory research exemption, and on one of those occasions—the Bolar 
amendment—Congress created one of the strongest exemptions in 
the world in terms of the amount of protected activity. Congress 
did so, amazingly, in the one industry where most economists and 
policymakers agree that patents are actually important for eliciting 
private investments. Perhaps more importantly, the House has al-
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ready considered one such proposal and its report213 on the matter 
provides a solid foundation for further debate—debate that should 
at least account for changes in economic analysis of the patent sys-
tem over the last twenty years. The time is therefore ripe for Con-
gress to revisit the research exemption. 
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